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THE EFFECT OF METROPOLITAN LIFE V. GLENN
ON ERISA BENEFIT DENIALS: TIME FOR THE
"TREATING PHYSICIAN RULE"
James Goodley*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypothetical: imagine you become ill or injured
and your longtime family doctor determines that you are unable to return to
your job as a result of this illness or injury. Fortunately, in the course of
your thirty years of service to your employer, you secured a disability
benefit plan. You apply to the insurance company which your employer
contracts with to administer its disability benefits. Despite strong evidence
from your treating physician concluding that you are disabled and unable to
continue working, the insurance company denies your disability benefit,
relying solely on the evidence of its hired consulting physician. The
insurance company's physician, with whom you have no prior medical
history, reviewed your medical records, rejected your family doctor's
opinion, and determined that you are able to work.
In consideration of your physical condition, you believe that you cannot
return to work. Determining that your social security disability is not
sufficient to support your family absent the sale of your home, you spend
thousands of dollars of your savings in attorney's fees to appeal the
insurance company's decision to deny your claim in federal district court.
The court determines that the insurance company operated under a conflict
of interest because it makes the benefit determinations and pays out the
benefits. However, in weighing the conflict of interest against the insurance
company's benefit determination, the court decides that the circumstances
presented by your case are insufficient to reverse the insurance company's
decision because the insurance company's decision was not an abuse of
discretion. You lose. Your attorney informs you that a further appeal will
not succeed. Faced with few options, you give up, sell your home, and
move in with your twenty-five year-old newly married son and his wife in a
small, crowded apartment. Stories like these are entirely possible under
employee benefits law today.
In Black & Decker v. Nord,' Kenneth Nord consulted with his personal
treating physician about hip and back pain he was experiencing. The doctor,
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in concurrence with Nord's three other treating orthopedic physicians,
determined that Nord suffered from lumbar disc syndrome and would be
unable to return to work until he made a full recovery.3 Relying on the
evidence of its own hired non-treating physician, the insurance company
reversed the opinion of the treating physicians.4 The Supreme Court found
that the insurance company "was not obligated to accord special deference to
the opinions of treating physicians." 5  The Fifth Circuit followed the
precedent set forth in Nord, and stated "[c]ourts cannot second guess the
weight that [the insurer] gave to the treating physician's and the [insurance
company hired] independent expert's respective opinions."
6
This Comment will demonstrate the failure of the Court in Metropolitan
Life v. Glenn 7 to adequately address the problem of conflicts of interest in
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) benefit
determinations. The Comment focuses almost exclusively on disability
cases. 8 It considers situations where a claimant has been denied a benefit
from an insured plan in which an insurance company makes ultimate benefit
decisions, or where the employer retains the right to reverse the insurer's
decision. 9 This Comment will begin by analyzing the background of
ERISA 10 and relevant court decisions, including Glenn. These cases have
1. Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Id at 826-27.
3. Id. at 826.
4. Id. at 827.
5. Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003).
6. See Young v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 F.App'x. 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2008)
(citing Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 401 (5th Cir. 2007);
Gothard v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 491 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2007)).
7. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343 (2008).
8. The analysis included in this Comment can be extended into other welfare
benefits, such as health and death benefits.
9. Additionally, the analysis in this Comment can be extended into self-insured
plans, where an insurer is not involved.
10. See infra Part 11.
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determined the judicial standard of review with respect to benefit
determinations made by conflicted ERISA fiduciaries, as well as the method
of applying the standard of review. This Comment will synthesize general
rules from post-Glenn cases by considering the role that the conflict of
interest factor plays, as well as the facts that courts have determined are
probative in reversing a conflicted fiduciary's decision. This synthesis will
also highlight when determinations have been made by a plaintiffs treating
physician, and when that determination can legally be overridden by a
physician hired by an insurance company for a one-time examination (or
even no actual physical examination at all). This Comment will then argue
that the arbitrary and capricious standard has been inappropriately imported
into court review of ERISA benefit determinations without the
corresponding checks and balances that exist in the public-sector
administrative law setting. It will demonstrate that greater checks and
balances are needed to counter the damage that a conflict of interest may
cause with respect to the integrity of the benefits determination process.
Finally, this Comment will demonstrate why the "Treating Physician Rule"
(TPR) is a proper rule to impose on ERISA fiduciaries and, while noting
potential problems with the rule, counter arguments against its adoption.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
ERISA provides certain procedural safeguards for workers with respect to
their employer-provided pension and welfare plans. ERISA states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act to protect interstate
commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to
participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with
respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the
Federal courts.
Employee benefit plans covered under ERISA include, inter-alia, pension
plans and employee welfare benefit plans, such as medical, disability, and
death benefit plans.' 3  ERISA provides that a plan fiduciary14 "shall
11. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(2006).
12. Id. at § 1002(2)(A).
13. Id. at § 1002(1).
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discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries." 5 ERISA also provides that a "civil action
may be brought ... by a participant or beneficiary ... to recover benefits
due to him under the terms of his plan."' 6 Finally, ERISA sets out the
internal claims procedures that plan fiduciaries must follow in making
benefit determinations by stating:
In accordance with regulation of the Secretary, every employee
benefit plan shall- (1) provide adequate written notice in writing to
any participant or beneficiary whose claim for benefits under the plan
has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such denial,
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant,
and (2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose
claim for benefits has been denied a full and fair review by the
appropriate named fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.17
Although the Secretary of Labor has further defined what constitutes a
"full and fair review" under Department of Labor regulations, 8 the judicial
standard of review regarding benefit denials (i.e. de novo or arbitrary and
capricious) had not been defined in either the statute or regulations.'
9
B. The Bruch Standard of Review
In Firestone Tire v. Bruch,2 ° the controlling case establishing the
boundaries of judicial review with respect to denials of benefits made by
ERISA plan fiduciaries, the Supreme Court held that the standard of review
for benefit denials would be de novo. However, if plan administrators
14. Id. at § 1002(21)(A) (defining a fiduciary).
15. Id.at§ 1104(a)(1).
16. Id. at § l132(a)(1)(B).
17. See Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1133
(2006) (emphasis added).
18. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
1 (h)(2) (2006) (defining "full and fair review").
19. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 (1989).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 115.
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agreed, 22 they could establish a deferential standard of review, abuse of
discretion, through controlling plan documents.23 This is essentially
identical to the arbitrary and capricious standard.24 Employers and unions
administering ERISA plans wanted more control of, and deference to, their
decision making. Consequently, and in response to Bruch, many plans
provided provisions including the abuse of discretion standard of review in
controlling plan documents. Bruch stated in dicta that if an ERISA plan
administrator operates under a conflict of interest, that conflict of interest
must be weighed as "a factor in determining whether there is an abuse of
discretion. '  However, Bruch did not comment on what a conflict of
interest is, when it is present, or how the factor is to be weighed in such
determinations.
C. Rejection of the Treating Physician Rule: Black & Decker v. Nord
In 1991, the Social Security Administration (SSA), responding to circuit
court opinions and widespread allegations that the agency was biased
towards denying disability benefits, adopted a "treating physician rule"
(TPR).28 The TPR required Social Security administrative judges to "give
,,29
more weight to opinions from [the claimant's] treating sources. In 2002,
22. The term "plan administrator," as used in this comment, refers to the type of plan
administrator that falls within the definition of "fiduciary," not the non-fiduciary types of
administrators such as the employees who merely write benefit checks to participants and
do not have discretionary control over administering the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A).
23. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 102.
24. See, e.g., Ladd v. ITT Corp., 148 F.3d 753, 754 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
arbitrary and capricious standard and the abuse of discretion standard are "different ways
of saying the same thing").
25. Roy F. Harmon III, The Debate Over Deference in the ERISA Setting-Judicial
Review of Decisions by Conflicted Fiduciaries, 54 S.D. L. REv. 1, 11 (2009).
26. Id.
27. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (1959)).
28. Rachel Schneider, A Role for the Courts: Treating Physician Evidence in Social
Security Disability Determinations, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 391, 391-400 (1996).
29. Social Security Administration, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) et seq. (2006).
2010
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following the lead of the SSA, the Ninth Circuit imported a similar TPR into
ERISA disability cases, which stated that, "the plan administrator can reject
the conclusions of the treating physicians only if the administrator 'gives
specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial
evidence in the record.'
30
In the Ninth Circuit case Black and Decker v. Nord, Kenneth Nord's
employer, Black & Decker, had established an ERISA insured disability
plan (with a typical two-tier structure) which granted MetLife the authority
to administer the plan.3 1 Nord applied to MetLife for disability benefits
under the first tier, but his claim was denied because Nord allegedly did not
meet the plan definition of "disabled. 3 2  Nord responded by filing an
internal appeal with Metlife. 33 Metlife then hired another physician whom
Nord was referred to for an "independent" evaluation.3 4 That physician
determined Nord was able to perform sedentary work.35 Thereafter, Metlife
recommended to Black & Decker that Nord's claim be rejected, as
assessment of which Black & Decker concurred.36
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of Black & Decker's
motion for summary judgment and granted Nord's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that Metlife operated under a conflict of interest and
did not properly follow the TPR.37 The court reasoned that Metlife and
Black & Decker failed to meet their burden of showing why the more
30. Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)).
31. Nord, 296 F.3d at 826. The judge found that "disability" under the first tier is
"complete inability.. .to engage in [Participant's] regular occupation with the Employer
(during the first 30 months of Disability)." However, "disability" under the second tier is
"Participant['s] complete inability.. to engage in any gainful occupation or employment
with any employer for which the Employee is, as of his Disability Date, reasonably
qualified by education, training, or experience". Id.
32. Id. at 827.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823, 827 (9th Cir. 2002).
37. Id. at 831-32.
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favorable one-time evaluation by Metlife's "independent" doctor should
have been given more weight than the corroborated opinions of Nord's four
treating physicians.
38
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nord. It reversed the Ninth
Circuit by reasoning that nothing in the ERISA statute, nor in the Labor
Department's ERISA regulations, requires ERISA plan administrators to
give greater weight to the opinions of treating physicians than to the
opinions of other physicians when making benefit eligibility
determinations. 39 Former Secretary of Labor Elaine Chao opposed the TPR
arguing in an amicus curiae brief that such a rule would, "unduly interfere
with the ability of employers to establish and design plans that confer on
plan administrators the discretion to weigh conflicting evidence.
4°
However, the Court noted in dicta that if the Secretary of Labor wanted to
promulgate a TPR, any court challenge to the rule would be reviewed under
the deferential Chevron standard.4 1  This dicta strongly suggests that
Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis could promulgate a TPR without having it
overturned in federal court.
D. Conflict of Interest Factor Weighed: Metropolitan Life v. Glenn
The 2008 Supreme Court case Metropolitan Life v. Glenn attempted to
clarify how the conflict of interest was to be weighed by the district courts in
plaintiff challenges to benefit denials. 42 A conflict of interest exists when
the plan administrator both determines eligibility for benefits and pays the
benefits out of its own pocket.43 This situation is quite common in ERISA
plans today, where an employer may start a disability, life, or health
insurance plan and contract with an outside insurance company to administer
38. Id.
39. Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825 (2003).
40. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Black &
Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003) (No. 02-469).
41. Nord, 538 U.S. at 831-32 (citing Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). The Chevron analysis will be addressed further in Part V.
42. See infra Part II.D.2.
43. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008).
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the plan logistics, including benefit eligibility determinations and the
payment of benefits from the insurance company's funds.4
1. Glenn's Facts
Wanda Glenn was an employee of Sears, which offered a typical two-
tiered disability benefit, administered by the Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company (MetLife).45 Under Sears' disability benefit system, an employee
was eligible for disability benefits during the first twenty-four months under
the first tier if the employee could not "perform the material duties of [the
employee's] own job" but was only eligible for benefits after twenty-four
months under the second tier if the employee could not perform "the
material duties of any gainful occupation for which ... [the employee was]
reasonably qualified. ' 4 While covered through her employment with Sears,
Glenn was diagnosed with severe dilated cardiomyopathy by her personal
treating physician.47 Glenn applied for and was granted disability benefits,
but after twenty-four months, was denied benefits because Metlife
determined she was "capable of performing full time sedentary work" under
the second tier inquiry.4
Glenn appealed Metlife's determination in federal court under 29 U.S.C. §
1132 (ERISA § 502).49 After the district court dismissed Glenns' claim, the
Sixth Circuit reversed Metlife's determination because MetLife operated
under a conflict of interest and did not take into account the SSA's
determination that Glenn could not work.50  The Court also found that
Metlife selectively relied on a treating physician's report that bolstered
MetLife's position, without noting a contrary, more detailed treating
physician's reports that showed Glenn could not work.5 1  Furthermore,
44. See infra Part III.
45. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2346.
46. Id. at 2346-47.
47. Id. at 2346 (cardiomyopathy is "a heart condition who symptoms include fatigue
and shortness of breath").
48. Id. at 2346-47.
49. Id. at 2347.
50. Id.
51. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2008).
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Metlife did not disclose all treating physician reports to those making the
benefit determination. Finally, Metlife did not consider evidence that
Glenn suffered from stress that aggravated her condition.
53
2. Glenn's Holdings
The Supreme Court ruled that MetLife operated under a conflict of
interest because it both determined eligibility of disability benefits and paid
benefits from its own finances,54 creating a conflict of interest in the
employer and in the insurer.55  The Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's
opinion.56 However, it held that the Bruch standard 57 was still applicable
and that even when a court finds a conflict of interest to be present, the
abuse of discretion standard still applies, rather than the de novo standard.58
The Court rejected any special burdens of proof or evidentiary rules and
directed that lower courts take the conflict of interest into account with all
other relevant factors to determine whether the plan administrator abused its
discretion. 59 The Court noted:
any one factor will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are
closely balanced ... The conflict of interest ... should prove more
important . . . where an insurance company has a history of biased
claims administration ... It should prove less important (perhaps to
the vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2348-50.
55. Id. at 2349-50 (2008) (stating "[flor one thing, the employer's own conflict may
extend to its selection of an insurance company to administer its plan. An employer
choosing an administrator in effect buys insurance for others and consequently (when
compared to the marketplace customer who buys for himself) may be more interested in
an insurance company with low rates than in one with accurate claims processing.").
56. Id. at 2352 (finding "[w]e can find nothing improper in the way in which the
court conducted its review").
57. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 102 (1989).
58. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2008).
59. Id.at2351.
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reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example by walling
off claims administrators from those interested in firm finances or by
imposing management checks that penalize inaccurate
decisionmaking irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits.
60
Justice Roberts concurred with the judgment, but argued that the conflict
of interest factor should only be considered "where there is evidence that the
benefit denial was motivated or affected by the administrator's conflict.
' 61
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, disagreed with the emphasis that the majority
placed on the Bruch conflict of interest dicta62 and argued that employers
should not be subject to the conflict of interest analysis, which he thought
should be reserved for third party insurers.63  Scalia warned that the
majority's opinion will result in uncertain application. 64
III SURVEY OF POST-GLENN CIRCUIT OPINIONS
A. Opinions Reversing Benefit Denials
The Second Circuit in McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.65 reversed a
denial of long-term disability benefits by an insurance company plan
administrator. Before Glenn, Second Circuit precedent required review of
a benefit denial de novo where a plan administrator operated under a conflict
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2353-54 (2008) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (stating "[i]t is the actual motivation that matters in reviewing benefits
decisions for an abuse of discretion, not the bare presence of the conflict itself").
62. Id. at 2357 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding "[t]he Court takes that
throwaway dictum [referring to the conflict of interest dictum in Firestone] literally and
builds a castle upon it. But the dictum cannot bear that weight").
63. Id. at 2356-57.
64. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2358 (2008) (noting "[tihere are degrees
of respect for the decisionmaker, perhaps-but the court either defers, or it does not.
"Some deference," or "less than total deference," is no deference at all.").
65. McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2008).
66. Id.
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of interest and the conflict could affect reasonable interpretation by the
administrator.
67
The court noted that previous Second Circuit case law was no longer
applicable in the wake of Glenn, which required the court to consider the
conflict of interest as one factor in determining whether there was an abuse
of discretion.68  In reaching its conclusion that the insurer acted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner by denying the benefit, the court considered
that the insurer had a "well-documented history of abusive claims
processing," the company relied on the medical opinion of an internal
appeals specialist over the more detailed and contrary medical opinion by
the plaintiff's treating physician, falsely stated that the appeals specialist was
a physician, and mischaracterized its reason for denying the benefits.
69
The Sixth Circuit in Johnson v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.
70
reversed a death benefit denial by an insurance company administrator,
classifying the determination as arbitrary and capricious. The court
determined that the administrator had relied on treating physician reports
after the insured-decedent had increased her life insurance coverage, to the
exclusion of a more relevant and timely contrary treating physician reports
before the coverage was increased.7'
67. Sullivan v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255-56 (2d Cir.
1996).
68. McCauley, 551 F.3d at 133 (citing Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. at 2348-51).
69. McCauley, 551 F.3d at 138.
70. Johnson v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 324 F. App'x 459 (6th Cir. 2009).
71. Id. at 461-62, 468-70 (finding that the plan administrator granted the lower level
of death benefits, but denied the added level because the insured, "made material
misrepresentations in the supplemental enrollment form." The insurer claimed had it
known of insured's full medical history, including alleged hypothyroidism, hypertension,
and palpitations, it would not have approved additional coverage. Although the
decedent's death certificate included cardiac arrest and pulmonary embolism as causes of
death and hypertension as a contributing condition, the decedent had not been diagnosed
with hypertension until after the higher level insurance took effect. The administrator's
reasoning in denying the benefits relied on reports that came out after the hypertension
diagnosis, ignoring earlier reports that did not reference hypertension as being the cause
of decedent's erratic blood pressure. The insurer also supplied shifting reasons as to what
it was that the insured failed to disclose about her medical history that would have led
insurer to not approve a higher level of coverage.).
2010
414 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXVI:2
The Eighth Circuit in Chronister v. Unum Life Insurance Co.72 reversed
an insured plan's Long-Term Disability (LTD) benefit denial as being an
abuse of discretion, where the insurer's plan administrator failed to follow
the procedures in its own disability manual.73 These procedures required
Unum to "give 'significant weight' to the SSA's disability determination and
to reject that determination only if there is compelling evidence" contrary to
that decision. 74 Unum's denial letter to Chronister did not even mention the
SSA's disability ruling, and did not explain why the SSA's opinion was not
given significant weight.75
B. Opinions Upholding Benefit Denials
The Third Circuit in Doroshow v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co.7 6
upheld the denial of LTD benefits by an insurance company administrator
based on the administrator's reading of a "pre-existing condition."
77
Employee Jay Doroshow saw his personal physician during the three month
pre-existing condition period.78 The physician who diagnosed Doroshow
with lumbrosacral plexitis, stated that he did not believe Doroshow had
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). 79 However, the administrator denied
Doroshow's LTD claim because he was diagnosed with ALS by his treating
72. Chronister v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 563 F.3d 773 (8th Cir. 2009).
73. Id. at 776-77.
74. Id. (noting that the "procedures were put in place pursuant to settlement
agreements and consent decrees between Unum and various state insurance
commissioners and the Department of Labor after investigations into Unum's claims-
handling practices.").
75. Id.
76. Doroshow v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 230 (3d Cir. 2009)
77. Id. at 231-32 (finding that the LTD plan documents stating disability benefits
were not available for an (exempt) employee whose disability is pre-existing three
months before employee's beginning date for coverage, where "pre-existing condition" is
one, "for which medical treatment or advice was rendered, prescribed, or recommended
within . .. [three months] prior to effective date of insurance.").
78. Id.
79. Id. at 232 (ALS is a type of motor neuron disease).
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physician specialist more than ten months after his effective coverage date.80
The court found the administrator's reading that Doroshow's doctors
"considered ALS as, at least, a possible explanation of his symptoms" to be
a reasonable basis for denying the claim, even though Doroshow was not
actually diagnosed with ALS during the pre-existing condition period.8 1
Judge Rendell filed a vigorous dissent, stating, "[t]he majority's conclusion
that his doctor's negative diagnosis of ALS during the relevant three-month
period somehow renders his later-diagnosed ALS a 'pre-existing condition'
under [insurer's] policy rests upon a seriously flawed reading of ... [the
policy] as well as [Third Circuit precedent]. 82
The Fourth Circuit in Champion v. Black & Decker83 upheld an insured
plan's denial of LTD benefits, where the treating physician's determination
was held ambiguous and the plan's reviewing physician diagnosed
participant's pseudoseizures as a "Mental Health Disability" (and not
84epilepsy alone). This decision took the disability out of the plan's
coverage after thirty months.85 The court cited eight Booth factors,86
including the conflict of interest factor, which it weighed in determining
whether the plan administrator abused its discretion in denying the benefit:
(1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and goals of the plan;
(3) the adequacy of the materials considered to make the decision and
the degree to which they support it; (4) whether the fiduciary's
interpretation was consistent with other provisions in the plan and
with earlier interpretations of the plan; (5) whether the
decisionmaking process was reasoned and principled; (6) whether the
decision was consistent with the procedural and substantive
80. Id.
81. Id. at 235.
82. Doroshow v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 230, 236-37 (3d Cir.
2009) (Rendell, J., dissenting) (citing Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 165-66
(3rd. Cir. 2002) (noting that such a doctrine "might open the door for insurance
companies to deny coverage for any condition the symptoms of which were treated
during the exclusionary period.")).
83. Champion v. Black & Decker, 550 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2008).
84. Id. at 360-6 1.
85. Id.
86. See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335
(4th Cir. 2000).
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requirements of ERISA; (7) any external standard relevant to the
exercise of discretion; and (8) the fiduciary's motives and any conflict
of interest it may have.
87
The Fourth Circuit held that under the first seven Booth factors, the plan
did not abuse its discretion. 88 Regarding the last factor, although the court
did determine that the plan operated under a conflict of interest, the Fourth
Circuit relied on the district court's finding that "the Plan did not act in a
biased manner" and found "no evidence of bad faith or improper intent."
89
The Circuit also found it persuasive, under Glenn, that Champion's "initial
claim was denied by a third-party administrator" (insurer CIGNA) and the
plan also provided a second internal appeal, to which Champion brought her
lawyer. The court found that these two voluntary acts by the plan
"increased the likelihood of an accurate final decision, thereby also reducing
the conflict factor 'to the vanishing point."'
91
In Young v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,92 the Fifth Circuit considered both
Nord and Glenn in reversing the district court and upholding a life insurance
plan administrator's denial of death benefits to a plan participant. This case
involved a situation where the administrator relied on a non-examining
physician's response to administrator's questions, which conflicted with the
treating physician's report.93  The court was heavily influenced by
administrative law standards from Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
87. Champion, 550 F.3d at 359 (citing Booth, 201 F.3d at 342-33).
88. Champion, 550 F.3d at 361-62.
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008)). Although the
plan was an insured plan, Black & Decker retained ultimate authority to grant or deny
benefits. Champion v. Black & Decker, 550 F.3d 353, 356 (4th Cir. 2008).
91. Champion v. Black& Decker, 550 F.3d 353, 361-62 (4th Cir. 2008).
92. Young v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 F. App'x 356, 356 (5th Cir. 2008).
93. Id. at 357-58, 362. The court found that the treating physician's opinion, listed on
the husband's death certificate, that the death was an "accident" as opposed to a
"sickness, disease, or infection," was consistent with the requirements for receiving
benefits under the plan documents. Id. The consulting physician determining that cause
of death was due to a history of hypertension disease. Id.
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Volpe94 and Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,95
and justified its reversal of the district court based on these earlier cases.96
The Fifth Circuit stated, "[c]ourts cannot second guess the weight that [the
insurer] gave to the treating physician's and the independent expert's
respective opinions."
97
The Tenth Circuit, in Waugh v. The Williams Companies, Inc. Long Term
Disability Plan,98 upheld a disability benefit denial by a self-funded plan,
99
where a conflict of interest was not alleged by plaintiff. 00 Defendant
TWC's board of directors appointed a benefits committee, who appointed an
administrative committee, who delegated full discretionary authority to a
claim administrator, with the administrative committee reserving authority to
decide on the final appeals process. 10 1  The court noted, "[t]he
Administrative Committee was not compensated for its service and there
was no evidence presented that [administrator's] compensation was tied to
the amount of claims approved or denied."'
10 2
94. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402
(1971) (noting that the concluding administrator's decision was not "arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion.").
95. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (stating
that the decision was based on "substantial evidence on the record considered as a
whole.").
96. Young v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 F. App'x 356, 360-62 (5th Cir. 2009)
(citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. 401 U.S. at 415-17; Universal Camera
Corp., 340 U.S. at 474).
97. Young, 293 F. App'x. at 363 (citing pre-Glenn Fifth Circuit precedent in Corry v.
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499 F.3d 389, 401 (5th Cir. 2007); Gothard v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 491 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2007)).
98. Waugh v. The Williams Companies, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, No. 08-
5123 (10th Cir. April 23, 2009).
99. See Waugh v. The Williams Companies, Inc. Long Term Disability Plan, No. 07-
CV-0446-CVE-SAJ at I (N.D. Okla. June 27, 2008).
100. Waugh, No. 08-5123 at 2-3. The court also failed to allow a remand to the district
court to allow plaintiff to establish a conflict of interest. Id.
101. Id. at4.
102. Id.
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C. Synthesizing the Circuit Opinions: The Weighing of Factors Process,
Although Resulting in Consistency, Has Not Been Adequate to Counter
Conflicts of Interest
Of all nine post-Glenn cases examined in this comment, only McCauley,
Johnson, and Chronister reversed the ERISA plan benefit denial. Common
to all of these reversing cases, as well as to Glenn, was the fact that each
case involved an insured plan, where the insurance company, operating
under a conflict of interest, selectively relied on certain medical reports over
contrary, more detailed reports by plaintiffs treating physicians. 0 3 Also
common to each was that multiple other factors existed that caused the court
to determine that the conflict of interest resulted in an arbitrary and
capricious actions by the insurer. 10 4  Both McCauley and Chronister
involved the infamous insurer Unum (or "First Unum" in McCauley)." 5 In
McCauley, Unum falsely stated that its appeals specialist was a licensed
physician.106 In Chronister, Unum did not follow the clear and specific plan
procedures requiring that there be compelling contrary evidence if an
administrator rejected an SSA's disability determination. ° 7 The insurer in
Johnson kept changing its reasoning for supporting the denial, and
selectively relied on evidence that was based on untimely and irrelevant
information. 1°8  The insurer in Glenn selectively ignored the SSA's
determinations, did not disclose all reports to the employer who made final
appeals decisions, and did not take into account evidence that the plaintiffs
condition aggravated stress.'
0 9
103. See supra Parts II.D. 1, 2, III.A.
104. Id.
105. See supra Part III.A. For a description of the notorious reputation of the insurer
Unum, see generally John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The
Unum/Provident Scandal and Judicial Review of Benefit Denials under ERISA, 101
Nw.U. L. REV. 1315 (2007).
106. McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir. 2008).
107. Chronister v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 563 F.3d 773, 776-77 (8th Cir. 2009).
108. Johnson v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 324 F. App'x. 459, 461-62, 468-70
(6th Cir. 2009).
109. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351-52 (2008).
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Of the six remaining cases, each of which upheld the benefit denial, every
case except Jenkins1l0 involved a plan administrator who consulted with and
relied on a non-examining physician's opinion to reject or render irrelevant
the plaintiff's treating physician's determination. Doroshow went even
further by upholding the decision of the plan administrator despite his
characterization of a negatively diagnosed condition (claimant was
110. See Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856 (7th
Cir. 2009). This case upheld an LTD benefit denial where an independent medical
examination (IME) doctor and insurance company's reviewing doctor disagreed with the
findings of plaintiffs treating physician regarding plaintiffs HIV disease and his
continuing ability to carry out work under the LTD plan's second tier of benefits. Id. at
858-60. In 1988, plaintiff was diagnosed with HIV and plaintiff filed for and was granted
LTD and Social Security benefits beginning in 1994. Id. at 858. After the first tier
benefit period of five years expired, the insurance company administrator granted
continuing benefits under the second tier, lasting from 1999 to 2006, at which point the
benefits were terminated. Id. In 1993, Jenkins' treating physician determined that
Jenkins' blood count (155) was within the range of an AIDS patient (below 200) and that
Jenkins was incapable of "even minimal sedentary activity;" his second treating
physician agreeing in 1997, adding his "condition was deteriorating with no chance of
improvement." Id. at 858-59. In 2005 a non-examining insurance company doctor
stated, "the HIV would not prevent [Jenkins] from performing full time light duty or
sedentary work," and that Jenkins maintained a weight of above 200 pounds and a T-cell
count of about 100, although a person with a T-cell count below 200 is considered to
have AIDS. Id. Jenkins soon went for an IME, the examining doctor concluding that
Jenkins "was at least able to attempt full-time employment." Jenkins v. Price
Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 859-60 (7th Cir. 2009). Although
Jenkins' second treating physician maintained his opinion that Jenkins could not perform
a full-time sedentary job, the insurance company's reviewing physician disagreed and
benefits were dropped. Id. at 860. In reviewing whether the insurer's decision to drop
LTD benefits was arbitrary and capricious under Glenn, the court stated:
Measured against this standard of review, Jenkins's appeal stands little chance.
We emphasize that the question isn't whether we would have terminated
Jenkins's benefits, but whether [insurer's] decision to do so finds "rational
support in the record." It surely does ... this is not the kind of case where the
conflict-of-interest factor plays an important role ... This is not one of those
borderline cases.
Id. at 861-62 (emphasis added). Anecdotally, the court discounted the idea that IME's
are necessarily truly independent, adding "that is not always the case, especially when the
professional's bill is paid by an insurance company (or a self-insured employer) with an
interest in receiving a report that minimizes, or discounts, a disability claim." Id. at 859-
60.
111. See supra Part III.B.
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diagnosed as not having ALS) as constituting a "pre-existing condition."
112
Champion held that the plan "increased the likelihood of an accurate
decision" by volunteering an extra internal appeal and by having a "third
party administrator" (CIGNA Integrated Care) deny the claim, per Glenn. l 1 3
These opinions make no inquiry into the relative weight given to the
plaintiffs treating physician's report and to insurance company hired
physician's report. The opinions also make no distinction between whether
the physicians hired by the insurance company actually examined the
plaintiff or merely reviewed paper medical records. Young strongly relied
on Nord and other pre-Glenn Fifth Circuit precedent to hold that the
insurer's reviewing physician does not even need to physically examine the
claimant. 1 4 Doyle,' 15 like Glenn, involved an LTD benefit denial where the
plan administrator credited the opinions of non-treating physicians who
disagreed with the plaintiffs treating physician, and who disregarded
plaintiffs complaints of pain and suffering."16  Although Doyle did not
involve a situation where SSA determinations were ignored or where the
112. Doroshow v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 230, 235 (3rd Cir.
2009).
113. Champion v. Black & Decker, 550 F.3d 353, 362 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Metro.
Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008)). See also, generally CIGNA homepage,
http://www.cigna.com/index.html (last visited March 5, 2010) (noting that CIGNA also
operates as a for-profit insurer).
114. Young v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 F.App'x. 356, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
Gothard v. Metro. Life Insurance Co., 491 F.3d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 2007); Black & Decker
v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 831 (2003)).
115. See Doyle v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1358, 1363
(11 th Cir. 2008), which upheld an LTD benefit denial by an insurance company plan
administrator, who consulted two non-examining independent physicians to review
Doyle's medical records from her treating physicians, and disregarded Doyle's
"subjective" complaints of pain and suffering. Id. The policy required that modes of
proof of disability include "chart notes, lab findings, test results, x-rays and/or other
forms of objective medical evidence in support of a claim for benefits. Id. Although
Doyle's treating physicians reported that Doyle "could not perform the material duties of
her 'Own Occupation' (under the second tier of the LTD benefit structure), the court
held that the insurer did not abuse its discretion because there was sufficient objective
medical evidence from the independent physicians to reach the conclusion that Doyle
could work and was thus not eligible for LTD benefits. Id. at 1362-63. The court held
that, "[b]ecause the evidence is close, we cannot say, even accounting for the conflict,
that Liberty Life abused its discretion in denying Doyle's benefits." Id.
116. Id. at 1358.
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administrator failed to disclose reports between the plan and insurer, plaintiff
Doyle appeared to have a stronger case with respect to the fact that the plan
administrator consulted with non-examining physicians,' 1 7 while Glenn
involved consultation with treating physicians.' S Nonetheless, the law has
not recognized this distinction.
For these reasons, at a minimum, the following is needed to reverse a
benefit denial: either bad faith (such as making false statements, failing to
disclose all the evidence, or shifting and illogical reasoning) or failure to
follow plan procedures in addition to a conflicted plan administrator
selectively relying on certain medical reports over contrary, more detailed
reports by plaintiff's treating physicians.' 19 This is quite a high threshold for
an ERISA plaintiff to overcome. An insurer can subjectively intend to deny
benefits to boost company profits and merely go through the required
procedural motions to justify an erroneous denial (as long as the insurer
followed all formal procedures under ERISA and under the plan, did not
explicitly lie, disclosed all required evidence, and stuck to its story).120 The
insurer will very likely not be reversed if there is some evidence, even barely
more than a scintilla, to support its position. It stretches the imagination to
claim that this scenario can be reasonably viewed as a close case, where the
conflict of interest factor serves the role of a mere "tiebreaker" as set forth in
Glenn. It seems that plaintiffs in this area do not really win cases. Rather
plan administrators lose cases through procedural mishaps. This is an unjust
result for plaintiffs who seek ERISA's protection.
IV. WHY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DEFERENTIAL STANDARD IN THE
ERISA SETTING IS NOT APPROPRIATE WITHOUT PROTECTIONS AGAINST
BIAS AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Administrative law analogies to ERISA are inappropriate, especially
given the problems of conflicts of interest and the unwillingness of courts to
make adequate inquiries into the benefit denial process. As benefit denials
by ERISA plan administrators have not been held to constitute "state
117. Doyle v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1358 (11 th Cir.
2008).
118. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2008) (stating that Metropolitan life
emphasized one of Glenn's treating physician's opinions to the exclusion of other, more
detailed treating physician's opinions).
119. See supra Part I1I.C.
120. Id.
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action," there are no constitutional protections for the claimant, such as due
process.' 2 1 Yet, although ERISA regulates private sector benefits,
determinations by ERISA fiduciaries are reviewed under the public-sector
administrative law "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 22 Glenn relied on
Universal Camera123 and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park124 to apply
administrative law standards of review in the ERISA setting.
25
However, the Supreme Court in Glenn has overlooked some of the
reasoning behind the deference given to agency adjudicators. With respect
to findings of fact under the substantial evidence standard of Universal
Camera, a "mere scintilla" is not enough evidence for an agency appeals
board to reverse the opinion of an agency adjudicator, such as an
126Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Rather, substantial evidence is
121. See Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 964
(2005) ("the term private due process is an oxymoron. Under our constitution there must
be a 'state action' to trigger the Due Process Clause."). But see Mark D. DeBofsky, What
Process is Due in the Adjudication of ERISA Claims?, 40 J.MARSHALL L. REV 811, 837-
38 (2007) (arguing "whether or not Congress intended such a delegation [of adjudicative
authority to a private party], the manner in which courts give deference to the findings of
ERISA plan administrator that internally review their own decisions is indistinguishable
from the adjudicative functions granted to administrative agencies under laws such as the
Social Security Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. . .the delegation. . . has
created a significant due process deprivation of the right to a statutorily guaranteed full
and fair review.").
122. Harmon III, supra note 25, at 2 (noting that although due process and APA
procedural requirements do not apply to the private ERISA setting, "[n]onetheless, in
virtually every important procedural aspect ofjudicial review in ERISA cases, the federal
courts have resorted to administrative law principles in judicial review of benefit
denials.").
123. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951)
(discussing agency fact finding).
124. See generally Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,
415-17 (1971) (explaining agency discretion).
125. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (2008) (citing Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc., 401 U.S. at 415-17; Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 495).
126. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 495 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (stating that "[s]ubstantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.")).
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required. 127 In rejecting the NLRB's reversal of the hearing examiner's
opinion and implying that the NLRB did only have "a mere scintilla" of
evidence to support its conclusion, the court in Universal Camera stated:
[n]othing suggests that reviewing courts should not give to the
examiner's report such probative force as it intrinsically commands.
To the contrary, § 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act contains
detailed provisions designed to maintain high standards of
independence and competence in examiners.'28
The Supreme Court relied on the standards of the Administrative
Procedure Act as it existed in 1951 to require substantial evidence in internal
agency appeals.1 29 Today, ALJs operate with even greater independence.
For example, ALJs cannot be removed except "for good cause" and only by
a determination of the Merit Systems Protection Board (outside of their
adjudicating agency) on the record after opportunity for a hearing. 30 An
ALJ's pay is set by statute and by the Office of Personnel Management, and
is not set according to the adjudicating agency's evaluation of the ALJ's
performance.131  These provisions help insulate the ALJ from agency
pressures to decide cases in conformance with agency preferences.
Agency heads, such as board members of the NLRB, as in Universal
Camera, are also held to high standards of independence and may be found
to violate the constitutional rights of parties to their adjudication. One
example is of this type of situation is Gibson v. Berryhill.132 The federal
district court determined that an Alabama board of optometrists-who were
all optometrists in their own private practice-intended to revoke the
licenses of half of Alabama's practitioners so as to appropriate business for
themselves. 33 Optometrist plaintiffs claimed that the board of o4ptometrists
violated their due process rights to a fair and impartial hearing. The U.S.
127. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495 (1951).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Government Organizations and Employees, 5 U.S.C. § 752 1(a) (2006).
131. See Govemment Organizations and Employees, 5 U.S.C. § 5372 et seq. (2006).
132. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 570 (1973).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Supreme Court upheld the district court's determination that the board was
"constitutionally disqualified from hearing the charges filed against the
appellees" merely on the grounds that the Board had a possible personal
interest in the case.135
Title 28 U.S.C. § 455136 requires justices, judges, and magistrate judges to
disqualify themselves from adjudicating cases where they may have personal
bias or direct financial interest.137 The American Bar Association (ABA)
has stated an "adjudicative decisionmaker must disqualify him or herself, or
be disqualified, from deciding any case in which the decisionmaker is
biased." 138 Both Congress and professional groups, like the ABA, seem to
believe that it is of such importance to maintain a high level of trust and
integrity in the judiciary, that additional mandatory standards beyond due
process are necessary.
It is reasonable to give government agency adjudicators wide discretion
because there are so many existing checks and balances in the system to
ensure there is no undue abuse of judicial authority.13 9  Additionally,
adjudicators should have a presumption of expertise in their legal specialty.
Their decisions should be considered valid because, as in the case of ALJs,
they examine the evidence directly and can scrutinize the demeanor of
135. Id. at 578-79 (citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (finding that"[i]t is
sufficiently clear from our cases that those with substantial pecuniary interest in legal
proceedings should not adjudicate these disputes.")). See also Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256-58 (2009). In this case, the jury awarded petitioners
$50 million in compensatory and punitive damages against respondent coal company. Id.
at 2265. The West Virginia Supreme Court voted 3-2 to reverse the jury verdict. Id. One
of the judges in the majority was supported by the coal company's CEO in his election
before the case was heard in the state's Supreme Court. Id. The CEO gave almost $2.5
million in contributions through a political organization that supported this judge, which
was over two-thirds of the funds the organization raised. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court
held five to four that the influence the coal company exerted constitutionally required the
judge to recuse himself. Id. The Court based its inquiry on an objective theory of
potential bias, and did not require a finding of actual bias. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).
136. See Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 455 et seq. (2006).
137. Id.
138. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A BLACKLETrER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/BlkLettSt/TOC.pdf.
139. See supra Part IV.
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witnesses to accurately assess credibility in ways that reviewing courts
cannot. However, the constitutional and statutory checks on the power of
agency adjudicators stand in sharp contrast to the lax statutory and judicial
scrutiny imposed on ERISA fiduciaries. If anyone under the ERISA
regulatory framework has the independence of an agency adjudicator, it is
the treating physician. Only the treating physician has little conflict of
interest, directly examines the claimant, and is an expert in the field. 140 Yet
strangely, under ERISA, the treating physician is given little deference.
However, the insurance company administrator, who has an inherent conflict
of interest and is not an expert in the relevant field of medicine, does not
need to examine the patient, and is given wide deference.
With respect to court review of ERISA benefit denials, the Seventh
Circuit held that, "[d]eferential review is not no review" and "deference
need not be abject." 141 The Supreme Court stated in Nord:
[p]lan administrators, of course, may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a
claimant's reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating
physician. But, we hold, courts have no warrant to require [on]
administrators.. .a discrete burden of explanation when they credit
reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's
evaluation.
1 42
But in practice, how does this standard mean anything other than "no
review"? This inconsequential standard reduces the courts, in applying the
arbitrary and capricious test, to rubber stamping the decisions of the
administrators. As long as plan administrators "credit" (by merely
acknowledging or making mention of) the claimant's evidence from a
treating physician, without explaining why they disregarded its weight, they
may not be reversed. 43 An administrator is merely required to provide
formalistic lip-service to the claimant. As the AARP noted in Nord, the
"plan's response [that it need not explain why it did not rely on the treating
physician's opinion] is extremely disturbing and disingenuous. . . . [The
plan's] viewpoint leads inexorably to the conclusion that a plan could grant
140. See, e.g., Bowman v. Heckler, 706 F.2d 564, 568 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that in
the Social Security context, "[o]ur reliance on the opinion of the treating physician is
based not only on the fact that he is employed to cure but also on his greater opportunity
to observe and know the patient as an individual.").
141. See Hess v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing Gallo v. Amoco Corp., 102 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1996)).
142. Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2008).
143. See supra Part III.C.
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or deny benefits at will. This is no standard at all."' 44  Professor John
Langbein noted the inconsistency between applying a deferential standard of
review and ERISA's purpose of protecting participants and beneficiaries,1
45
146
and also contrasted this discrepancy with traditional trust law. Citing
"law and economics" guru and Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner, and
his pre-Bruch remarks for support, Professor Mark DeBofsky argues that the
administrative law's "arbitrary and capricious" deference given to ERISA
.... 147
administrators is inappropriate. The congressional intent of ERISA to
give claimants a "full and fair review" could not have been this superficial,
for such a reading would render ERISA § 503 meaningless.
This Comment does not seek to re-interpret the Constitution or drastically
rewrite ERISA to declare that ERISA fiduciaries are state actors required to
give claimants due process. Rather, it seeks to propose a common-sense
regulation as one possible way to counter the serious conflict of interest that
undermines the integrity of benefits determinations by ERISA fiduciaries.
Selectively using the administrative law paradigm to give conflicted ERISA
fiduciaries deference over their decisionmaking, while preventing the
administrative law paradigm from being used to protect claimant's rights is
both asymmetrical and unjust.
144. Brief for the AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, Black &
Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
145. See Langbein, supra note 105, at 1336 (arguing that ERISA's statutory purpose
under Section 404 is to protect participants and beneficiaries and that the regulatory
standards should be mandatory, rather than waiveable or "default" as they are under
Firestone v. Bruch).
146. Id. at 1342 (arguing that "[a]lthough the drafter of a private trust may indeed
insist on greater judicial deference to trustee decisionmaking... to give maximum effect to
the wishes of the transferor-that is, to private autonomy. In ERISA, by contrast,
Congress employed trust law concepts for regulatory purposes, in order to limit private
autonomy.") (emphasis added).
147. See Mark D. DeBofsky, The Paradox of Misuse of Administrative Law in ERISA
Benefit Claims, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv 727, 728-30 (2004) (arguing against the
importation of administrative law deference into the ERISA trust setting, noting the
remarks of Posner, J. in Van Boxel v. The Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836
F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "pension rights are too important these days
for most employees to want to place them at the mercy of a biased tribunal subject only
to a narrow form of 'arbitrary and capricious' review.")).
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V. THE LABOR DEPARTMENT SHOULD ADOPT THE TPR
One way to establish stability in the law and to treat benefit claims fairly
is to require insurers to follow the treating physician's report, absent strong
evidence countering the physician's accuracy, integrity, or judgment. The
TPR does not mandate benefits, but rather establishes procedural rights if
and when employers choose to offer disability plans.148 This rule would
simulate some effects of due process, and would lead to more accurate
decisions commensurate with social security adjudications. The TPR aligns
with ERISA's purpose of procedurally protecting employees who receive
benefits from their employer.149 Under Nord, the change needs to come
from the executive branch, or from Congress, but cannot come from the
judiciary alone.
If TPR were part of the law, the outcomes in Doroshow, Champion,
Young, and Doyle would likely be different.150 Such a rule would actually
direct the plan administrator in how to weigh the evidence. Instead of
having "substantial evidence" to justify a denial by weighing evidence in
any direction, the plan administrator could "reject the conclusions of the
treating physicians only if the administrator 'gives specific, legitimate
reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record. ,,151
Other variations on this standard could require the plan administrator to have
specific legitimate reasons for rejecting the opinions of the treating
physician, based on either a preponderance of evidence or clear and
convincing evidence. These variations would remove doubts about the
administrator's ability to find some small bit of evidence (beyond a "mere
scintilla") to discredit the treating physician and justify an erroneous denial.
Either of these rules should maintain (or create even greater) consistency in
the law, reduce litigation, and ultimately provide greater justice for those
erroneously denied benefits.
The Labor Department under President George W. Bush argued as amicus
curiae in Nord:
148. See infra Part V.
149. See Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(2006).
150. See supra Part III.B.& C. (arguing that the plaintiffs' treating physicians' opinion
would have to be followed by the ERISA fiduciary, absent some evidence discounting the
integrity of that opinion).
151. Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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In the absence of a regulation requiring a treating physician rule,
courts should not impose such a rule under their authority to fashion a
"federal common law" under ERISA.... Such a rule would unduly
interfere with the ability of employers to establish and design plans
that confer on plan administrators the discretion to weigh conflicting
evidence. 152
Nonetheless, a primary purpose of regulating welfare plans under ERISA
is to ensure certain minimum disclosure and review standards to protect
participant rights under plans voluntarily set up through their employer.'
53
To the extent that ERISA "interferes" with the establishment and design of
these plans, it does so only procedurally, not substantively.' 54 In the same
way that the independent physician rule "interferes" with the operation of
ERISA plans by requiring fiduciaries to consult with an outside health care
professional, 5 5 a treating physician rule would likewise interfere with plan
operation by requiring administrators to give greater weight and deference to
the opinion of a treating physician. The independent physician regulation
has not been struck down in federal court and there is nothing to suggest that
if the labor department enacted the more stringent "treating physician rule,"
it would be struck down under Chevron'5I or any other federal court
152. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6,
Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003) (emphasis added).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
154. Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 833 (2003) (quoting Lockheed Corp. v.
Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996)) (stating that "[i]n contrast to the obligatory, nationwide
Social Security program, 'nothing in ERISA requires employers to establish employee
benefits plans. Nor does ERISA mandate what kind of benefits employers must provide
if they choose to have such a plan."')).
155. See Employee Benefits Security Administration, Department of Labor, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2560.503-1(h)(3)(iii, v) (2006) (noting that "in deciding an appeal of any adverse
benefit determination ... the appropriate named fiduciary shall consult with a health care
professional who has appropriate training and experience in the field... [and] shall be an
individual who is neither an individual who was consulted in connection with the adverse
benefit determination that is the subject of the appeal, nor the subordinate of any such
individual." The health care professional must be a different person than was involved in
the initial benefit denial. It is in this sense only that there is any independence required in
the internal appeals process).
156. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (holding that where a statute is ambiguous as to a particular issue, an agency's
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precedent. The ERISA statute itself does not directly address whether a
treating physician's opinion is to be given controlling weight. Therefore, the
statute is ambiguous on that point. There is no reason to think that if the
DOL promulgated a TPR, a federal court would hold the DOL's regulation
to be an impermissible or unreasonable construction of ERISA. To the
extent that the administrator's discretion has been undermined, the result is
fair. Insurance companies profit by making as many benefit denials as
possible and thus should not be trusted to make accurate benefit
determinations without effective oversight.
The Bush Labor Department went on to argue:
Moreover, a treating physician rule is not necessary to guard against
arbitrary decisionmaking by plan administrators, as courts may review
plan administrators' decisions to determine whether the administrator
acted unreasonably in disregarding evidence of a claimant's disability,
including the opinions of treating physicians.1
57
However, as demonstrated by this comment's survey of post-Glenn circuit
opinions, court review of the reasonableness of a plan administrator's
decision, short of failure to follow plan or ERISA procedures or acting in
bad faith, is wholly inadequate because "[c]ourts cannot second guess the
weight that [the insurer] gave to the treating physician's and the independent
expert's respective opinions."'
' 58
ERISA commentator Roy Harmon has argued that the treating physician
rule is not necessary, despite the Supreme Court's reversal in Nord'59 and
that "it seems the courts have defacto turned the treating physician rule into
construction addressing that issue will be upheld if it is a reasonable "permissible
construction of the statute.").
157. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7,
Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003) (emphasis added).
158. Young v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 293 F.App'x.. 353, 363 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing
pre-Glenn Fifth Circuit precedent in Corry v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 499
F.3d 389, 401 (5th Cir. 2007); Gothard v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 491 F.3d 246, 249 (5th
Cir. 2007)). See also supra Part II.D.2 - Part III.C.
159. Roy F. Harmon et al., Weighing Medical Judgments: Explaining Evidentiary
Preferences for Treating Physician Opinions in ERISA Cases After Black & Decker
Disability Plan v. Nord, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 157, 158 (2009) (stating "the
Supreme Court's rejection of the treating physician rule in ERISA cases does not imply
that district courts must disregard the superior probative value of treating physicians
opinions when appropriate.").
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an "examining physician" factor." 160 However, the "examining physician"
factor alone does not constitute sufficient grounds to reverse a benefit denial
because, as already demonstrated, Doroshow, Champion, Young, and Doyle
were all upheld despite the fact that the plan administrator consulted with
and relied on a non-examining physician's opinion to refiect or render
irrelevant the plaintiffs treating physician's opinion. 16  Thus, the
administrators were ultimately permitted to deny the benefit. 62 All of the
surveyed cases that reversed a benefit denial involved the administrator's
selectively relying on more-favorable medical evidence to the exclusion of
plaintiffs treating physician's opinion, and additional bad faith or failure to
follow explicit plan procedures. 163 It is apparent that anything short of
mandating that special weight be given to the treating physician's opinion,
with appropriate exceptions,164 causes unsatisfactory results for claimants.
Although the Bush Labor Department argued "nothing in the common law
of trusts requires plan administrators, in making factual determinations, to
give special weight or deferential consideration to particular evidence,"
165
the Restatement (Second) of Trusts lists six specific factors for courts to use
in ruling on whether a trustee has abused its discretion:
(1) the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the terms
of the trust; (2) the purposes of the trust; (3) the nature of the power;
(4) the existence or nonexistence, the definiteness or indefiniteness of
an external standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee's
conduct can be judged; (5) the motives of the trustee in exercising or
refraining from exercising the power; (6) the existence or
nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with that of the
beneficiaries. 166
160. Id. at 186.
161. See supra Part II.B.-C.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Social Security Administration, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) et seq. (2006).
165. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12, Black
& Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d. (emphasis added).
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The factors are quite similar to the Booth factors noted in Part I B., with
element seven of Booth being nearly identical to element four of the
Restatement. 67 Although the Restatement does not specifically call for the
TPR, the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) argued in
2003, as amicus curiae in Nord, that the circuits were "in a state of confusion
when determining how a conflict affects the standard of review."' 68 Thus, it
concluded that adoption of the treating physician rule would provide an
external standard that is consistent with the Restatement and would allow for
greater consistency in the ERISA common law.169 NELA's arguments have
proven true today, as Nord and Glenn have overruled the weight and burden-
shifting methods of review previously used in the Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits, leaving the courts to weigh evidence more freely and
unpredictably. 170  Even if Nord and Glenn have made ERISA disability
cases more consistent and predictable, it is only because the cases have had
the effect of trivializing the role of the conflict of interest to the point where
it is considered a mere "tie-breaking" factor. 17 Consequently, the hurdle
has become so great that plaintiffs will probably lose and many would-be
plaintiffs simply will not bother taking their cases to court.
A. Treating Physician Opinions are More Reliable than Other Medical
Evidence
The treating physician's medical opinion is the most reliable opinion and
is deserving of weight in a benefit determination. 72 The Social Securityregulations adopting the treating physician rule offer common-sense
167. See supra Part II.B.
168. See Brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 14, Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
169. Id. at6, 15.
170. Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-68 (11 th Cir.
1990). See also Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 1317, 1323 (9th Cir. 1995).
171. Metro. Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-51 (2008).
172. See James A. Maccaro, The Treating Physician Rule and the Adjudication of
Claims for Social Security Disability Benefits, 64 N.Y. ST. B. J. 28, 43 (1992) (finding
that "[e]vidence from an unbiased and competent treating physician is usually the best
reflection of a claimant's medical condition. It is therefore improper for an
Administrative Law Judge to ignore such evidence.").
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reasoning as to why the rule is sound and practical policy, by providing that
the SSA will generally:
[g]ive more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these
sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide
a detailed, longitudinal picture of your medical impairment(s) and
may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be
obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of
individual examinations. When we do not give the treating source's
opinion controlling weight, we apply [factors including (i) length of
the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination; (ii)
nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (iii) supportability of
an opinion; (iv) consistency; (v) specialization; and (vi) other factors]
(emphasis added). 173
If the treating physician's opinion is more credible than a one-time
examining physician, it is far more credible than a non-examining physician
hired by an insurance company who merely reviews paper medical records
to make a benefit determination. The treating physician rule recognizes that
treating physician opinions are more trustworthy than other pieces of
evidence because they are based on a professional and fairly disinterested
expert who is rendering an opinion by direct examination over a long period
of time.174
A physician who is paid only occasionally for treating a plaintiff should
be viewed as more trustworthy than an insurance company, due to the
inherent incentives and payment designs of each group. The insurer's goal
is profit maximization, 1' 5 despite that fact that under ERISA, it is supposed
to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. 176
Physicians are licensed by state boards of medicine and thus are subject to
higher ethical standards than insurers, as they may lose their license for
violating certain standards. 177 The American Medical Association has also
173. Social Security Administration, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) et seq. (2006).
174. Id.
175. See generally 2 Fletcher Corp. Forms § 1883.52 (2009) ("Management's first
priority should be to continuously strive for maximum shareholder value.").
176. Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § I1 04(a)(1)
(2006).
177. See e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-404, et seq. (2009).
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published specific opinions on conflicts of interest 17 and on standards for
IEPs and IMEs, 179 violation of which may serve as a basis for loss of
membership in the AMA.180  Though physicians are no doubt subject to
pressures from those that are paying them (notwithstanding their ethical and
legal obligations), it would seem the pressures on a plaintiffs treating
physician would be less serious than on an IME or IEP, because the IME or
IEP is likely to have more repeat business with the insurer. NELA has noted
that although there is some concern about the trustworthiness of a treating
physician, the more pressing issue is the problem of insured plans hiring
repeat IMEs and IEPs who are thus incentivized against the truly
independent practice of medicine, therefore making it much more likely for
insurers to "essentially serve as judge and jury for claims against
themselves."''
1
Finally, those who are in need of disability payments, as demonstrated by
treating physician evidence, should be able to receive those payments
without constant petty suspicions that their claim is frivolous or
178. See American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 8.03,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinion803.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (noting that "[under no
circumstances may physicians place their own financial interests above the welfare of
their patient. The primary objective of the medical profession is to render service to
humanity; reward or financial gain is a subordinate consideration.").
179. See American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 10.03,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics/opinionl003.shtml (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (finding that Industry Employed
Physicians and Independent Medical Examiners "should not be influenced by the
preferences of the patient-employee, employer, or insurance company when making a
diagnosis during a work-related or independent medical examination.").
180. See American Medical Association Rules for Review of Membership,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/our-people/ama-councils/council-ethical-
judicial-affairs/goveming-rules/rules-review-membership.shtm (last visited Feb. 27,
2010) (stating that the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs may "issue
appropriate sanctions, including denial of membership to an applicant or expulsion,
probation, or suspension of a member. Denial of membership to an applicant or
expulsion of a member is imposed only when the Council determines that the physician
under review has seriously violated the Principles of Medical Ethics and that it would
discredit the AMA to have that physician as a member.").
181. Brief for the National Employment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 11, 18, Black & Decker v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003).
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fraudulent. 182 It is better to err on the side of giving out too many benefits
than to deny benefits to people who qualify and need it.
B. "Physician Advocacy'" Does Not Justify Rejecting the Treating Physician
Rule
Social Security Administrative Law Judge Kevin Foley has argued that
"[d]octors often are not the independent, objective, and impartial
professionals they were once thought to be ... [for they] frequently become
patients' advocates and, on occasion, the purveyors of deception."'
8 3
Because it is possible that the treating physician's opinion is not credible due
to physicians acting as their patients' advocates, the TPR allows the plan
administrator to "reject the conclusions of the treating physicians [where]
the administrator 'gives specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are
based on substantial evidence in the record."" 84 Where there is legitimate
deviation from the general rule, there is a relatively small and discrete set of
reasons for supporting that deviation.' 
85
Judge Foley himself specifically recommends that the medical profession
police itself much more stringently, by enacting and enforcing ethical
provisions, and instructing medical students against being "patient
advocates."' 186 This is a sensible recommendation. Physician groups such as
the AMA could help in this regard by amending their bylaws so that in cases
where a physician engages in fraud, the AMA Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs would have to "issue appropriate sanctions, including denial
of membership to an applicant or expulsion... when the Council determines
182. See George Szary, The Treating Physician Rule: Morgan Presumption in Social
Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income Cases, 17 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 303, 338 (1990) (arguing that "individuals with disabilities seeking
assistance from the government should not be faced with a system which operates on the
assumption that all those who approach it are attempting to perpetuate fraud unless they
prove otherwise.").
183. See Kevin F. Foley, Physician Advocacy and Doctor Deception A Double-Edged
Attack on Due Process, FED. LAW, July 2001, at 24,25-27 (2001).
184. Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)).
185. See generally Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527 et seq. (2006).
186. Foley, supra note 183, at 28.
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that the physician under review has seriously violated the Principles of
Medical Ethics and that it would discredit the AMA to have that physician as
a member."' 87 The Council should take a more stringent position on the
level of wrongdoing needed to "discredit the AMA to have that physician as
a member."'
188
Judge Foley also recognizes that laws exist prohibiting disability fraud by
physicians, but that those laws are ineffective. 189 Accordingly, such laws
should be more aggressively enforced by states,'9° or more stringent laws
enacted.
C. Fraudulent Collusion Does Not Justify Rejecting the Treating Physician
Rule
A step beyond physician advocacy is the collusion between physician and
claimant to fraudulently obtain benefits. Opponents of TPR might contend
that the rule would incentivize dishonest physicians to make an agreement
with the claimant to fraudulently make a disability finding and share in the
proceeds.' 9' However, as argued by Szary, disability recovery, which is
usually only a fraction of the claimant's pre-injury income 192 and which the
claimant will probably need to survive on, is simply too small an enticement
for a dishonest physician.193 Most doctors are already well-compensated and
even dishonest ones would not take on the great risk of injuring their
professional, medical, and business reputation for such a small return. 94
187. American Medical Association Rules for Review of Membership, supra note 180
(emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. Foley, supra note 183, at 28.
190. See generally MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH Occ. § 14-404 (2009).
191. Szary, supra note 182, at 338-39.
192. See e.g., Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856,
858 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the LTD plan provided for payment of sixty percent of
pre-disability income level).
193. Szary, supra note 182, at 338-39.
194. Id.
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D. Avoidance of a Chilling Effect Does Not Justify Rejecting the Treating
Physician Rule
Undoubtedly, any time new or more stringent regulations are proposed,
those opposed to them will argue that the regulations will have unintended
negative consequences. Arguments under Glenn are no exception, even
given Glenn's very limited inquiry into benefit denials.' 95 As the argument
goes, the regulated party (such as an employer) might be chilled from hiring
more workers or offering benefits, due to cost of compliance with the rule. 9
6
Thus, the regulation would ultimately hurt the class of people that it was
intended to protect. 197 However, in the context of LTD and death benefits,
this argument fails. Disability and death benefits are much less costly to an
employer than are pension and health benefits. To the extent that employers
are not hiring or are cutting back on benefits due to cost, it is because of the
high expense of health benefits, a major and perennial subject of debate in
Congress.198 Disaster benefits, like death and LTD benefits, are less costly
than health and pension benefits due to the fact that workers use health care
and their retirement savings at a much greater rate. To be sure, there are
industries with high levels of workplace disability and death. 199 However,
those industries are nearly all covered under state worker's compensation
195. See e.g., Katie Day, Can Scalia Save Employer-Provided Health Plans? An
Analysis of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn, 62 TAx LAW. 915, 927-28 (2009)
(arguing that "[t]he majority's approach [in Glenn] of assigning a level of significance to
a conflict subjects employers and insurers to increased litigation costs, or, in the
alternative, abandonment of their cost containment structures" and "gives employers one
less incentive to provide ERISA-governed health care plans.").
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Christopher Lee, Rise in Cost of Employer-Paid Health Insurance
Slows, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2007, A4, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/1 1/AR2007091100666
.html (finding that the "[i]ncrease [t]his [y]ear [s]till [o]utpaces [w]ager [g]rowth, as
[plercentage of [p]eople [c]overed [s]hrinks").
199. See Steven L. Willborn, et al., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 866-
67 (4thed. 2007).
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200
systems, with the more dangerous industries paying more into the system,
based on their "experience rating[s]."'2°
Welfare benefits such as LTD and death might be thought of as deferred
compensation, in that the employee is presumably willing to be paid less in
current compensation in exchange for the greater security that welfare
benefits bring. The disabled employee should be due what was promised to
him: a portion of previous pay in the case of permanent disability, or
survivor benefits to the employee's spouse. The employee is impliedly
promised that when he is disabled, he will actually receive the benefit
promised, not merely a statement that there is substantial evidence to support
an insurer's denial, stretching the concept of reasonableness. Anything less
than a truly full and fair hearing on disability is a broken promise. A sense
of false security discourages the claimant from demanding more in current
compensation, from saving more in case of such tragedies, or from
attempting to buy better disability coverage on his own.
E. The Treating Physician Rule was Implemented to Counter Government
Adjudicator Bias and is Even More Necessary Under ERISA
Prior to SSA's rulemaking adopting the TPR, the circuit courts of appeal
were using varying versions of the rule in court challenges to SSA disability202
benefit denials. The circuits developed these rules in response to public
perception that the SSA held a political bias in favor of denying benefits, at a
time of "dramatic cuts in the disability rolls during the Reagan
administration [which have been] well documented." 20 3 SSA noted in its
final rulemaking that it adopted the rule in response to the decisions by the
circuits.
204
200. Id. at 863 (finding that "nationally, about 96% of workers are covered").
201. Id. at 866-67.
202. See Schneider, supra note 28, at 396. See also, e.g. Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d
508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987) (arguing that the SSA "must give substantial weight to the
testimony of a claimant's treating physician, unless good cause is shown to the
contrary."). See also, e.g., Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding
that "the opinion of a claimant's treating physician [must] be given great weight and may
be disregarded only if there is persuasive contradicting evidence.").
203. See Schneider, supra note 28, at 391.
204. Id. at 400.
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As already explained, government agencies theoretically operate under
high standards of independence, with protections against bias. Although
these stringent standards were in place and "[b]ias is not established merely
because the decisionmaker has rejected the claims or the testimony of a
party or because the decisionmaker has fixed views about law, policy or
factual propositions not related to specific parties,"20 6 the courts still felt that
SSA's bias towards rejecting disability benefits warranted the countering
TPR rule.20 7
If government adjudicators who have stringent protections against
conflicts of interest and bias must be reigned in with further restrictions like
the TPR, then private sector ERISA administrators, who inherently operate
under a conflict of interest and who do not have any of the protective
insulation that government adjudicators do, should be subject to the TPR.
Although political pressure is real, financial pressure to maximize profits
and meet the financial bottom line is at least as great, if not greater.
F. The Treating Physician Rule is the Least Drastic Way to Ensure
Accurate Decisionmaking
Throughout ERISA's history, plaintiffs and their supporters have argued
that the standard of court review for benefit denials should be de novo, rather
•• 208
than arbitrary and capricious. Some have argued that Congress delegated
executive authority to ERISA administrators in passing the act, and therefore
due process should attach.209 A colorable argument can even be made that
ERISA just doesn't work, its pre-emption clause has done more harm than
good, and Congress should let the states take over regulating this area.
Despite the merit of these arguments, federal courts have not followed any
of them.2 11 The TPR is a modest, yet still effective rule that will likely
205. See supra Part IV.
206. American Bar Association, A Blackletter Statement of Federal Administrative
Law, supra note 138.
207. See generally Schneider, supra note 28.
208. Langbein, supra note 105, at 1336, 1342.
209. DeBofsky, supra note 121, at 837-38.
210. See generally Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (2006).
211. See supra notes 208-210.
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accomplish much of the goals of this comment's suggestions, at least in the
disability and life insurance arenas. There is no measure less drastic than
TPR which would be effective, especially in view of the failure of Glenn's
non-binding weighing process. An Examining Physician Rule (EPR) would
be inadequate because insurance companies already employ examining
physicians as well as non-examining physicians and improperly weigh the
evidence based on their conflicting financial interests. An ERISA
administrator should be required to have at least a preponderance of
evidence, or even clear and convincing evidence to deviate from the treating
physician's opinion, so as to make it harder for an ERISA administrator to
invent faulty reasons to deny benefits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Administrative law not only gives agency adjudicators wide discretion in
deciding cases, but also imposes high standards of integrity and
independence on those adjudicators. z 3 Under ERISA, only half of the story
is true: ERISA fiduciaries have wide discretion but very little in the way of
standards for independence. 214 Insurers should not be able to have it both
ways. If their decisions are to be reviewed deferentially, as are decisions of
government agencies, then claimants need to have some similar procedural
protections that simulate the protections they have in dealing with the
government. Otherwise, insurers should be reviewed de novo. If the kind of
bias that insurance companies operate under were found to exist in an
Article I or 111215 adjudication, the decision-maker would likely be violating
216judicial rules of conduct and the rights of the parties to the case. Glenn
has done little to remedy this problem and has trivialized the poisoning
impact that conflicts of interests play in the benefit review. The Department
of Labor should issue a regulation requiring the use of the TPR by insurers;
it represents a practical way to ensure more integrity and independence in
ERISA benefit decisions because the rule relies on the opinion of the more
212. See, e.g. Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856,
861 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding an examining physician's opinion sufficient evidence). See
also Doyle v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1358, 1363 (11 th
Cir. 2008) (noting a non-examining physician's opinion is sufficient evidence).
213. See supra Part IV.
214. Id.
215. U.S. CONST. art. I; U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
216. See supra Part IV.
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independent expert who actually examines the patient, has been doing so
over a substantial period of time, and lacks the profit motive to deny
benefits. The rule does not require rigid application, and has several discrete
exceptions. Any negative effect that the regulation may incur on employer
benefit packages should be minimal. It is time to make ERISA's promise of
protection of employee benefits a reality.
